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Market-oriented reform in the Australian electricity industry
Introduction
From World War II until the early 1980s, electricity in Australia was provided by
public monopolies owned primarily by state governments, and operated as statutory au-
thorities. Although the arrangements differed in their details, the electricity industry in
each state was characterised by a high degree of vertical and horizontal integration and,
except in crises such as the widespread blackouts in New South Wales during the late
1970s, a substantial degree of autonomy. The major authorities were controlled primarily
by engineers, and pursued objectives defined in terms of meeting the needs of households
and business for a reliable supply of electricity, with prices being set to cover average
costs.
The reforms1 of the 1980s and 1990s were designed to change almost every aspect
of the pre-reform institutional framework. The integrated, state-owned and bureaucratically
run electricity monopolies would be replaced by a profit-oriented, privately-owned industry,
operating in a competitive national market characterised by a clear separation between
the activities of generation, transmission and distribution, and retailing. Consumers would
be able to choose their supplier in a competitive retail market. With the partial exception
of privatisation, which was rejected in several states, these reforms were nearing completion
by 2000.
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1 The term ‘microeconomic reform’ is generally accepted as referring to a wide range of
market-oriented policy initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s, including those affecting the electricity
industry. Some of these policy initiatives have increased welfare and others have not. In using the term
‘reform’, it is necessary to focus attention on the literal meaning ‘change in form’, without necessarily
adopting the connotation ‘change for the better’.
The reform program in the electricity industry consists of a number of elements,
which are logically independent, but mutually supportive. First, there is the creation of
the National Grid and the National Electricity Market. Second there is the process of
corporatising government business enterprises engaged in electricity supply. Third is the
restructuring of the industry and the separation of generation, distribution and retail
functions. Fourth is the regulation of natural monopoly activities such as electricity
transmission and distribution. Finally, the reform process is regarded as complete when
the industry is fully privatised.
Most commentators on the reforms have concluded that they have been highly
successful in increasing efficiency and reducing electricity prices. By contrast, discussion
of similar reforms in the United States and the United Kingdom has been considerably
more critical, in part because, in some instances, electricity prices have increased substan-
tially. In this paper, the costs and benefits of reform of the electricity industry are
assessed. Following a brief discussion of international experience, each of the five compo-
nents of the reform program discussed above is analys d in turn and the outlook for the
future is considered.
International Experience
Although a variety of pooling arrangements have been adopted in many jurisdictions,
the recent upsurge in the creation of electricity markets may be traced to the national
market established in the United Kingdom by the Thatcher government following the
privatisation of the British electricity industry.
As with the Australian case, discussed in detail below, the British system allowed
for electricity to be sold both through long-term contracts and through a spot market or
‘Pool’. Although most evaluations of the electricity reforms in the United Kingdom have
been, on balance, positive, serious problems emerged. To maintain high sale prices, the
generating component of the former public monopoly was divided into only two main
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firms. In combination with design features of the Pool, this gave rise to opportunities for
the two main suppliers to extract monopoly rent through strategic bidding (Green and
Newbery 1992). In 1998, the Pool was abolished. Opinion remains divided as to whether
this decision was an appropriate response, or whether design changes to the Pool could
have yielded superior outcomes, as argued by Newbery (1997).
Apart from the the United Kingdom model on which the design of the Australian
electricity market was based, most Australian discussion of electricity markets overseas
has focused on experience in the United States, and, in particular, on the failure of the
Californian electricity market. The Californian market was established at a time of excess
supply of electricity, and took the opposite approach to that embodied in the 1998
reforms in the United Kingdom. Long-term contracts were prohibited and all sales were
required to go through the spot market. Moreover, retail prices for most consumers
remained fixed.
Problems with the Californian system did not become evident until the (northern)
summer of 2000, when the system was barely able to meet peak demands. By the end of
2000, the market price of electricity had risen from $50/MWh to $500/MWh. The main
distributors, Pacific Gas and Electric and Southern California Edison, who were required
to buy electricity at market prices and sell it at fixed retail prices, faced bankruptcy. On
January 8, 2001, the state Governor announced that the deregulation scheme, which he
called a ‘ colossal and dangerous failure’, would be abandoned (Davis 2001).
Supporters of the Australian electricity reforms have generally sought to play down
the difficulties experienced in the United Kingdom and to argue that the failure of the
Californian system was due to incomplete deregulation and, in particular, the cap on
retail prices and the prohibition of long-term contracts. The latter claim has some validity,
but is subject to important qualifications.
First, as will be argued below, any system of electricity markets faces a tension
between the short-term function of electricity prices in allocating a scarce and nonstorable
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resource and the long-term function of providing appropriate investment signals. Neither
in the United Kingdom nor in California have these roles been properly reconciled.
Second, many Australian advocates of electricity reform have relied on short-term
experience of declining prices to argue that the reforms have been beneficial. As the
Californian experience shows, an excessive focus on reducing prices in periods of excess
supply can contribute to system failure in periods of excess demand.
Finally, it is always possible, ex post, to explain the failure of a system in terms of
inappropriate implementation. A crucial feature of system design is that systems should
be robust to minor errors and unexpected shocks. Repeated failures, no matter how easily
explicable in retrospect, are evidence that the system as a whole is flawed. It is necessary
to consider the extent to which the Australian system has the robustness required for a
system in which even brief failures are extremely costly.
The National Grid and the National Electricity Market
This section describes the process leading up to the creation of the National Grid
and the National Electricity Market. More detailed chronologies are given by the Industry
Commission (1995a) and Rann (1998).
The National Grid
As was economically rational in the light of Australia’s geography, separate electricity
supply industries were initially established in each state.2 Limited connections between
Victoria and New South Wales were established as part of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-
electric Scheme, which also created a new generator, the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric
Corporation. A link between Victoria and South Australia was added subsequently. Moves
towards a National Grid encompassing all states and territories except Western Australia
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2 The example of the railways suggests that this would have happened even if it was not
economically rational.
and the Northern Territory began with the establishment of the National Grid Management
Committee in 1991.
In physical terms the National Grid involved the expansion of existing interstate
links and the creation of a range of new links including Riverlink (between New South
Wales and South Australia), Basslink (between Victoria and Tasmania) and Eastlink
(between New South Wales and Queensland). The plans for the National Grid also
allowed scope for private initiatives to construct additional links. In practice, most of the
additional links ran into political and environmental difficulties. Riverlink was rejected
by the South Australian government when it appeared likely to reduce the sale price that
could be realised in the privatisation of ETSA, the state electricity enterprise. Basslink
was the subject of extensive debate, and a decision to support its construction by a
private consortium was only announced by the Tasmanian government in February 2000.
Eastlink was abandoned in favour of an alternative route (Westlink) with completion
expected in 2001. As a result of these delays, the national electricity market is still only
partially integrated, with different prices prevailing in different states. The creation of a
fully operational National Grid s still some years away.
The creation of a National Grid is a necessary condition for the creation of a
National Market, but it does not necessarily imply the creation of such a market. In a
different policy environment, the decision to build a National Grid could have been the
precursor to the establishment of a unified national electricity supplier comparable to
Telecom Australia. More realistically, the existing arrangements for trade between the
states could have formed the basis for the more frequent and extensive trading made
possible by the National Grid.
The National Market
Following the agreement to construct a National Grid in 1991, attention turned to
the design of a National Electricity Market, modelled primarily on that of the United
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Kingdom. Although it was already evident that the British model had serious flaws, it was
hoped that Australia could learn from the British experience. The process of designing
and implementing the National Electricity Market was undertaken jointly by the Nat onal
Grid Management Committee and the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).
The core of the Market was the creation of a continuous-time auction market, in
which  generators and users enter bids on a half-hourly basis. Each bid takes the form of
a supply or demand schedule indicating willingness to supply or demand electricity.
These bids are combined to form aggregate demand and supply schedules.
Because available capacity and consumption can fluctuate, market clearing is
undertaken at five-minute intervals. The intersection of the aggregate demand and supply
schedules determines the dispatch price required to equate demand and supply for the
given five-minute period. All generators with bids less than or equal to the dispatch price
have their bids accepted, and, conversely, all users with bids greater than or equal to the
dispatch price have their demand met. These prices are averaged over a half-hour period
to determined a spot price, which is the price received by generators and paid by purchasers.
In addition to spot purchases, participants in the market may enter into long-term bilateral
contracts or trade in a forward market. The Australian spot and forward markets are
operated by a private limited-liability company — the National Electricity Market
Management Company (NEMMCO).
Competition and prices
Much discussion of electricity reform in Australia is based on the assumption that
‘competition reduces prices’. H nce, the decline in the cost of electricity, at least for
contestable users, that has occurred since the introduction of the National Electricity
Market, is seen as evidence that the reforms are working well.
Such an interpretation is simplistic. Assuming that pre-reform prices included an
element of monopoly rent, the average price should be reduced by the introduction of a
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competitive market. Under competition, the long-run average price should be driven
down to equal the long-run average cost of a technically and allocatively efficient producer.
The Industry Commission (1995b) estimated that the achievement of world best practice
would reduce the cost of electricity generation, transmission and distribution by around
20 per cent, though this estimate was criticised by Quiggin (1996).
In the short term, however, the reduction in costs resulting from competitive long-run
average pricing will generally be small in relation to the greater variability in prices
associated with the operation of the spot market. The dominant effect of the introduction
of a competitive spot market will be to push prices below long-run average cost in
periods of excess capacity and to raise prices above long-run average cost in periods of
excess demand. As will be shown below, this variation in prices is crucial if the electricity
market is to perform its allocative functionand provide appropriate investment signals.
Planning and prices
Before the introduction of the National Electricity Market, the electricity supply
industry operated on the basis of central planning. New generating capacity was constructed
on the basis of estimates of future ‘needs’, sometimes subject to constraints on the availability
of capital. Short-run operation of the system relied on the concept of an ‘order of merit’
that determined which units of generating capacity would be used to supply demand.
Broadly speaking, low-cost ‘baseload’ stations were designed to operate continuously,
supplemented by higher-cost peakload capacity in periods of higher demand.
In an electricity market, the central planner is replaced by price signals. In the short
run, generators submit bids specifying their willingness to supply electricity at particular
prices. These bids are matched with demand from purchasers of electricity to determine
the spot price. The spot price not only equilibrates the market in the short term, but also
provides firms with information on the likely profitability of investments in new generating
capacity
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As would be expected, under standard assumptions, a perfectly operating electricity
market will produce exactly the same outcomes that would be chosen by a central
planner seeking to maximise aggregate producer and consumer surplus. This point may
be illustrated by considering a radically simplified model of the electricity market.
Suppose there are two possible states of demand, normal and peak, with associated
demand curves Dn(p) and Dp(p). In a given year, the state of demand is normal with
frequency  and peak with frequency (1-). Suppose also that there are two fixed-proportions
generating technologies, baseload and peak, and confine attention to solutions in which
both technologies are used. The baseline technology has an annualised capital cost of Kb
per unit of generating capacity, and an operating cost of cb  per unit of electricity supplied.
The peak technology has capital cost Kp<Kb  and operating cost of cp>cp... Then the
market equilibrium will have normal and peak prices pn and pp such that
pp =cp+Kp/
pn + (1-)pp Kb+cb
and that the corresponding levels of generating capacity are those that would be chosen
by a perfectly informed planner. In this case, the order-of-merit rule is to operate baseload
capacity continuously and peak capacity in peak periods only, the same solution as in the
market equilibrium.
As in the planning debate between Hayek (1937) and advocates of market socialism
such as Lange and Taylor (1948) and Lerner (1944), advocates of the electricity market
argue that a smoothly functioni g market will achieve automatically the outcomes that
would be chosen by a perfectly informed planner pursuing an efficiency objective. Since,
in practice, planners are not perfectly informed and are likely to pursue private objectives,
the market is to be preferred.
Welfare analysis
8
The welfare effects of changes in prices can be analysed, under the standard assumption
of a representative consumer, using the theory of price indexes. In the simple example, set
out above, consider a move from some uniform price p0
  to the price pair p1
n and p1
p. Let
q0
n = Dn(p0), q0
p = Dp(p), q1
n = Dn(p1
n), q1
p = Dp(p1
p).
The change in the welfare of the representative consumer is bounded below by
p0(q0
n+q0
p)-(p1
nq0
n + p1
pq0
n), the reduction in the cost of the original consumption bundle,
and bounded above by p0(q1
n+q1
p)-(p1
nq1
n + p1
pq1
n), the extra cost of purchasing the final
consumption bundle at the original price. In particular, assuming p1
n <p0< p1
p, so that
q0
n<q1
n, q0
p>q1
p, this implies that the change in consumer welfare is overstated by considering
the reduction in the quantity-weighted price of electricity, but understated by considering
the change in the average daily or hourly price.
For a complete evaluation it is also necessary to take account of changes in producer
surplus, tax revenues and external effects. It is clear that producer surplus has declined,
but measurement of the decline is complicated by the structural changes in the industry.
Similarly, the study of tax revenue is complicated by the imposition and removal of
various special levies during the reform process. Environmental externalities are discussed
below.
Weaknesses of the price mechanism
The crucial feature that distinguishes the spot electricity market from most other
markets for goods and services is the variability of prices. Even in the most variable
commodity markets, it is rare for prices to vary by more than a factor of ten in the course
of a single year. By contrast, in the National Electricity Market prices routinely vary by a
factor of 500 from one day to the next. Whereas prices in periods of excess capacity
usually vary between $20/MWh and $40/MWh, the price in periods of excess demand
frequently reaches the maximum of $10 000/MWh. Although periods of excess demand
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are rare, they account for a significant proportion of the annual revenue accruing to
generators. For example, if the price is normally $20/MWh, but reaches the peak price of
$10 000/MWh for four hours during each of four days per year, these four days will
account for approximately half of the annual revenue accruing to generators.
A number of difficulties arise here. First, there is the regulatory limit of $10
000/MWh. The theory underlying the spot market is based on the absence of any such
regulatory constraints. There is no clear justification for the choice of an upper limit of
$10 000 as opposed to say $5000 or $20 000, yet these alternative choices lead to large
differences in the annaul revenue accruing to generators. This in turn implies that investment
signals will be significantly distorted by the choice of an inappropriate upper limit.
A second set of difficulties, at least in the short term arises from the fact that most
final consumers are not connected to meters sufficiently sophisticated to respond to price
variations (or even, in many cases, time-of-day variations). Hence, the demand side of
the price signalling mechanism is ineffective. Moreover, the mismatch between highly
variable producer prices and fixed consumer prices requires wholesalers to absorb variation
in their margins or to seek insurance against price variations.
The third problem arises when suppliers possess market power. Because short-run
demand is highly inelastic, even modest market power can yield large monopoly rents
(London Economics 1995; Industry Commission 1995a).  These issues, and the effectiveness
of competitive restructuring as a response, are discussed below.
The market and the environment
Electricity production gives rise to a number of environmental externalities of which
the most important is the emission of carbon dioxide as a result of the combustion of
carbon-based fossil fuels. Carbon dioxide is the most important of the ‘greenhouse gases’
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3 As a referee points out, separate issues arise with hydroelectricity. In the construction
phase, flooding of valleys can give rise to methane emissions. However, as no new hydroelectric
projects are under serious consideration in Australia, any costs associated with methane emissions may
which contribute to global warming (Inter overnmental Panel on Climate Change 1995).3
A standard externality analysis implies that the environmental damage should be
offset by a Pigovian tax, set equal to the marginal damage associated with carbon dioxide
emissions. In the case of global warming, the relevant variable is the amount of carbon
consumed, so that the proposed Pigovian tax is commonly referred to as a carbon tax.
Alternatively, users of carbon-based fuels could be required to hold tradeable emissions
permits set at a level such that the market price of permits is equal to marginal environmental
damage.
The short-run impact of the National Electricity Market has been to reduce prices in
periods of low demand to levels approximately equal to the market cost of the fuel
consumed in generation. This reduction in prices has contributed to an increase in total
greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation, which rose from 129.1 million
tonnes in 1990 to 168.6 million tonnes in 1998 (Australian Greenhouse Office 2000,
table 1-5).
Since the market price of fuel does not incorporate any implicit or explicit externality
charge, it is reasonable to conclude that the price of fuel (and therefore the price of
electricity) is below the socially optimal level, and therefore that the operation of the
National Electricity Market has contributed to excessive consumption of electricity and
fossil fuels.
The adverse environmental effects of the National Electricity Market are likely to
be reduced in the long run, as excess capacity is reduced by the retirement of older
coal-fired plants, and as carbon taxes or similar market-based policies to reduce emissions
are introduced. However, as Keynes appositely observed, in the long run we are all dead.
Corporatisation
Until the 1980s, most organisations in the electricity supply industry were statutory
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be regarded as 'sunk'
authorities. Statutory authorities were themselves an organi ational innovation arising
from the recognition that the organisational structure of a government department was not
appropriate for an organisation primarily involved in the production of marketed goods
and services.
The organisation of a government department is based on the principle of ministerial
responsibility. The department is directly accountable to the minister on a day-to-day
basis. Conversely, in the pure Westminster theory, the minister is personally responsible,
and accountable to Parliament, for all actions of the department.
The idea of the statutory authority was to provide rganisations with substantial
operational independence, while requiring them to pursue the policy objectives set by the
government. Since these objectives typically involved trade-offs between the interests of
taxpayers, employees, consumers and public interest groups, statutory authorities were
commonly managed by boards made up of representatives of these groups.
Critics of the statutory authority model of service provision argued that government
policies should be directed to the achievement of specific, sharply–defined objectives
(the term ‘transparent’ was commonly used), rather than being justified in terms of a
broadly-defined notion of the public good. Critics sought to clarify the objectives of
government agencies, and to require that, if policies were justified in the name of particular
objectives, they should be funded out of the relevant budget. The idea of transparency
was used to justify the replacement of statutory authorities, whose managers had a general
objective of promoting the public interest, with corporatised enterprises, which were
directed to maximise profits subject to the satisfaction of specific ‘Community Service
Obligations’ (CSOs).
In form, corporatisation normally involves the replacement of government agencies
or statutory authorities with a corporation operating under the company laws applicable
to private corporations but with all the shares (at least initially) owned by the g vernment.
In some cases, government-owned corporations may be set up under special legislation
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differing in some respects from that applicable to private corporations.
The main substantive change associated with corporatisation is the abandonment of
the idea that government business enterprises should pursue a social welfare objective.
Like private sector managers, the managers of a corporatisedpublic enterprise have a
fiduciary obligation to maximise profits, subject to regulatory or other external constraints.
Governments may, if they choose, impose a community service obligation under
which some users pay less than the costs of the services that they consume. The cost of
the community service obligation is then included as a payment from the budget to the
enterprise. Community service obligations have been relatively unimportant in the elec-
tricity sector — the most important have been the provision of subsidised access in some
rural areas and limited discounts for pensioners.
Corporatisation was highly successful in the goal of increasing the profitability of
the publicly owned electricity industry. The case of South Australia is typical. From 1946
until 1 July 1995 the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in South
Australia was undertaken by a state government instrumentality, the Electricity Trust of
South Australia. The Trust was corporatised under the name ETSA in 1995, after several
years of organisational changes that had already created a commercial orientation. From
1992-93 to 1998-99, earnings before interest and tax rose from $232 million to $433
million. Reductions in employment contributed substantially to growth in profitability.
From 1992-93 to 1998-99, the number of employees fell from 4200 to 2300
Efficiency gains and transfers
The improvements in the profitability of electricity enterprises following corporat-
isation may be traced to two main sources. First, as noted above, there were large reductions
in employment, although these were partly offset by increased use of contractors. Rdu tions
in employment were feasible for a number of reasons. First, because labour costs were a
relatively small proportion of total costs (between 30 and 40 per cent in most cases), and
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because the costs of disruptions to electricity supply were high, unions were in a strong
bargaining position in the pre-reform period. Hence, unions were able to impose a range
of work practices, pejoratively referred to as ‘featherbedding’, which reduced the effort
required from employees. Union power was eroded by the high unemployment and institu-
tional changes of the 1980s, and this permitted employers to impose work practices which
required higher levels of effort. Second, the statutory authorities were largely managed by
engineers, who placed a high weight on the reliability of electricity supply, and therefore
favoured high expenditure on maintenance. Corporatisation resulted in a transfer of power
to financially-oriented managers, who sought to reduce apparently unnecessary maintenance
costs.
In the short run, increases in work effort are primarily a transfer from employees to
employers. Some workers are made redundant and therefore suffer a reduction in wage
income, while the employer benefits from the corresponding reduction in costs. The
workers who remain must supply more effort for the same wages, and therefore receive a
lower wage per unit of effort.
Assuming that the original situation of low work effort represents a suboptimal
contract, in that workers would prefer to work harder in return for a commensurate
increase in wages, and that workers made redundant in the electricity industry ultimately
find employment elsewhere in the economy, the elimination of ‘featherbedding’ will
produce a net welfare gain in the medium term. However, since workers will still be
worse off, the increase in profitability overstates the net efficiency gain for the economy.
The second major source of improved profitability has been a reduction in excess
capacity. In part, this was simply a recovery from over-optimistic investments during the
late 1970s and early 1980s, and should not be attributed to reform. Similarly over-investment
and overcapacity is regularly observed in capital-intensive private sector activities, such
as the office construction market in the late 1980s. Reductions in excess capacity also
arose because the managers of co poratised electricity enterprises were generally willing
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to operate with less reserve capacity than the engineering-oriented managers of the former
statutory authorities. The implications for security of supply are discussed below.
Competitive restructuring
Before the reforms, the Australian electricity industry displayed a high degree of
vertical and horizontal integration (at least within any given state). The archetypal form of
industry organisation was that of an integrated state-owned monopoly which provided all
electricity services, from generation, transmission and distribution to metering and billing,
for the entire state. Integration was less complete in some states. In New South Wales,
distribution was undertaken by county councils and in Queensland by regional electricity
boards. On the other hand, vertical integration sometimes extended beyond the electricity
industry (as normally defined) to include coal mining at one end of the production chain4
and the sale and repair of electrical appliances at the other.
A crucial element of the reforms was vertical and horizontal disintegration of the
industry. Vertical disintegration was undertaken by separating the industry into separate
components of generation, transmission, distribution and retailing. Each of these compo-
nents was horizontally disaggregated into separate firms to encourage competition.
An aggressive approach to horizontal disaggregation was consistent with the policy
atmosphere of the early 1990s, which saw, for example, the construction of parallel
optical fibre telecommunications networks in several Australian cities. It was also
encouraged by a critical evaluation of the British electricity market. The general practice
in British privatisations was to sell monopoly enterprises such as British Telecom and the
London Airports Authority intact in order to maximise the sale price. This practice was
criticised by commentators such as Domberger and Piggott (1986) because opportunities
to make markets more competitive were foregone. In the case of electricity, the main
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4 Vertical integration between coal-mining and electricity generation in the United States is
analysed by Joskow (1985).
generation component of the former Central Electricity Generating Board was broken
into two private firms, National Power and PowerGen. (The unprofitable nuclear electricity
plants were retained in public ownership.)
Green and Newbery (1992) examined the British market design, and concluded that
the market structure would allow for the extraction of substantial monopoly rents. A
crucial analytical issue arises from the fact that the market design requires the submission
of price schedules rather than prices (leading to Bertrand competition) or fixed quantities
(leading to Cournot competition). Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show that duopoly
competition in supply schedules produces an indeterminate outcome. Any price–quantity
pair from the joint-profit-maximising monopoly price and aggregate supply to the perfectly
competitive Bertrand outcome may be supported as a Nash equilibrium. Within this
range, producers prefer higher prices and lower quantities.  Klemperer and Meyer (1989)
present an alternative equilibrium concept. Grant and Quiggin (1994) show how this
concept may be applied to yield a markup-pricing equilibrium intermediate between the
Cournot and Nash cases.
Economies of scale and scope
The designers of the Australian National Electricity Market sought to avoid the
anticompetitive features of the British market, and therefore encouraged the breakup of
state electricity generation enterprises on horizontal as well as vertical lines. Electricity
suppliers were browen into separate generation, transmission and distribution and retail
enterprises. In addition, integrated electricity generators were broken into a number of
competing firms, while distributors were broken up into separate firms, each with a
monopoly in a given region.
The restructuring of the electricity industry was based on the presumption that
economies of scale and scope are relatively unimportant. The vertical separation of
generation, transmission and distribution eliminates any economies of scope that might
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have arisen with an integrated supplier. Moreover, the creation of a number of small
generators implies the loss of economies of scale that might be achieved by larger firms.
Empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. Christensen and Greene (1976) estimated
that in 1970, the flat component of the cost curve ranged from about 20 to 67 terawatt-hours
per year, corresponding to generating capacity of between 5 and 12 gigawatts of generation
capacity, with an optimum of 33 terawatt-hours per year (8 gigawatts  of capacity). By
contrast, the Industry Commission (1995a) cited the conclusion of London Economics
(1995) that the optimal aggregate capacity for a generating enterprise is 3 gigawatts and
that diseconomies of scale may be observed when capacity exceeds 6 gigawatts.
For comparison, ABARE (1995) estimated total electricity consumption in the four
states currently linked to the National Grid at 140 ter watt-hours per year (25 gigawatts
of capacity) for 1993-94. On the Christensen–Greene estimates, ignoring interconnection
problems, this demand could be met most efficiently by an industry with four generation
enterprises. Taking account of interconnection limits, the technical optimum would have
three generators operating in the New South Wales–Victoria market, and one each in
Queensland and South Australia. This is exactly the configuration that prevailed prior to
restructuring. By contrast, the London Economics estimates imply that the optimal organ-
isation would have at eight generators, and that substantially larger numbers of firms are
consistent with efficient production.
The Industry Commission (1995a) argues that the optimal scale of operation has
declined over time, primarily because of increased reliance on gas-fired plants which
have a lower minimum efficient scale, and because markets provide alternatives to coordi-
nation activities undertaken within firms. On the other hand, C ristensen and Greene
(1976) concluded that the minimum efficient scale doubled between 1955 and 1970 and
that the optimal scale rose by 60 per cent. It seems likely that, for a given fuel mix and
market structure, the optimal scale of operation is increasing over time. This conclusion
is consistent with the observation of large-scale mergers between private electricity enter-
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prises.
An alternative interpretation of the restructuring process is that the breakup of state
electricity monopolies is a prelude to reintegration of the industry through mergers between
companies operating in different states, most of which, in turn, would be subsidiaries of
multinational electricity enterprises. On this view, economies of scale and scope may be
captured by a ‘multi-plant’ enterprise operating in widely disparate locations.
Retailing, wholesaling and distribution
Other unresolved issues in relation to vertical disintegration relate to the retailing
function. The separation of retailing and distribution is based partly on the belief that
consumers will benefit from a choice between completing packages of electricity pricing
and billing, and partly out of concern to limit, as far as possible, the natural monopoly
component of the industry. However, for most households, and particularly in the absence
of sophisticated metering, electricity is a fairly simple commodity. Assuming prices are
set at an appropriate level, it may be that most householders will prefer to continue buying
their electricity from the distributor as they have done in the past.
The object of policy should be to permit the natural market outcome to emerge,
without allowing unfair exploitation of upstream monopoly power by distributors. The
various state electricity codes contain structural separation provisions designed to achieve
this end, but their performance has yet to be fully tested.
Because most consumers have little experience of choosing between electricity
suppliers, special consumer protection regulations have been introduced to ensure that
competing retailers adhere to appropriate codes of conduct. The experience of the tele-
communications industry, where a range of dubious marketing practices had been observed,
was important in guiding policy in this respect. However, it is reasonable to expect that,
over time, industry-specific consumer-protection regulations will be replaced by reliance
on general consumer law, possibly extended to cover the special characteristics of infra-
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structure services.
The organisation of the National Electricity Market and the retail electricity market
also implied the creation of a wholesaling function in electricity. Since electricity is
purchased in five-minute blocks in the market, while retail consumers face constant
prices over periods of a month or a quarter, it is necessary that some market participant
should undertake the function of buying electricity at the spot price and supplying it in
wholesale quantities at a stable wholesale price. This function is conceptually distinct
from the retail activity of providing metering and billing services in return for a markup
on the wholesale price. In much discussion of the electricity market it seems to be
assumed that wholesaling will be integrated with retailing. However, the wholesaling
function must be primarily concerned with risk management, while the retailing function
is concerned with customer service. It seems unlikely that joint provision of wholesale
and retail services will yield positive economies of scope.
Regulation
Before reform,the statutory authorities responsible for the supply of electricity were
largely self-regulating. The authorities were accountable to ministers and therefore ultimately
to Parliament but, in normal circumstances, were left to manage their own affairs. Although
enterprises were normally expected to cover their costs, and often to generate a surplus
sufficient to fund capital expenditure, they were not expected to act as profit-maximising
firms. Rather, it was assumed that they would act in the public interest.
When statutory authorities were corporatised and privatised, it was hoped that price
signals from competitive markets would lead them to act in a socially optimal ways. This
assumption clearly did not apply to the natural monopoly components of the industry
(transmission and distribution). Thus, some form of regulation was needed to prevent the
exploitation of monopoly power.
The crucial regulatory issues relate to the pricing and access policies of enterprises
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engaged in electricity transmission and distribution. The issues are simplest in the case of
a ‘stand-alone’ enterprise supplying a homogeneous service such as transmission of
electricity. In the absence of regulation, such an enterprise would charge the monopoly
price, capturing rent and distorting the prices faced by consumers.
Australian regulators have faced issues of this kind in a number of different industries
as a result of microeconomic reform. Although the policies adopted have varied as the
results of differences in the regulatory stance of regulators in the various jurisdictions and
of differences in the circumstances of particular enterprises, a standard approach to the
setting of prices for monopoly operators has emerged. This approach has five main
elements:
(i) the estimation of current efficient operating costs;
(ii) choice between a revenue cap and a price cap;
(iii) the use of a CPI-X mechanism to encourage efficiency improvements over
time;
(iv) determination of an optimised capital base; and
(v) calculation of a market-equivalent rate of return;
These elements may be considered in turn. The estimation of current efficient
operating costs is conceptually straightforward, although in some cases, it may be technically
complex.
A typical revenue cap rule is
Rt = e
-xtCo+ Kt,
where
Rt  is real revenue in period t;
Co is the estimate of current efficient operating cost;
x is the required rate of real efficiency improvement;
 is the market rate of return for assets with comparable risk characteristics; and
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Kt is the optimised capital base for period t.
A typical price cap rule is
Rt = (e
-xtCo(Qt)+ Kt)/Qt,
where Qt is an estimate of the volume of output in period t and c st Co(Qt) incorporates an
element of variable cost. Relative to a revenue cap, the price cap transfers quantity risk
from consumers to the regulated firm.
The idea of a CPI-X mechanism was originally introduced by Beesley and Littlechild
(1983), who presented it as a once-off transitional rule in the period between the privatisation
of an industry and the arrival of a fully competitive market. However, in the natural
monopoly case, which includes most of the privatisations advocated by Beesley and
Littlechild, the regulated firm retains its monopoly position indefinitely, and the level of
efficient costs must be reassessed at regular intervals. Hence, the CPI-X mechanism is
part of a more sophisticated form of cost-based regulation, rather than an alternative to
such regulation.
The capital base is most commonly estimated using a depreciated optimised replace-
ment cost (DORC) method. Variations such as deprival value have also been used. The
most problematic issue concerns ‘stranded’ capital assets which arise as the result of
investments that are, at least ex post, unnecessary to supply the service in question. The
difficulty is to avoid rewarding mistaken investment decisions while allowing for ex nte
uncertainty about future demand.
Finally,  the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) has generally been used to determine
rates of return. Other possibilities such as the use of arbitrage pricing theory have been
considered. Application of CAPM allows a wide range of variation with regard to the
treatment of corporate and personal taxation, estimates of the market risk premium and
so on.
The problem for a regulator is to set a price low enough to avoid distorting the final
21
price faced by consumers but high enough to provide appropriate incentives for new
investment. Decisions of the Victorian Office of the Regulator General have created
particular controversy. The private owners of Victorian electricity distribution businesses
have protested against recent reductions in allowable rates of return, claiming that they
were promised higher rates when they entered the industry, and that lower rates will
discourage investment.
The difficulties of balancing the interests of consumers and the owners of electricity
distribution assets are particularly acute in the case of privatised enterprises, and even
more so when the buyers are foreign-owned utility enterprises, as has generally been the
case in Australia. Any decision to set prices too high results in a permanent loss to the
community, whereas under public ownership, the costs imposed on consumers are offset
by corresponding benefits to taxpayers. For most households, these effects will approx-
imately cancel out.
A final regulatory issue, which has, as yet, received inadequate attention is that of
reliability of supply. A series of spectacular infrastructure failures including the failure of
the electricity distribution network in Auckland, the Longford gas explosion in Victoria,
concern over possible contamination of the Sydney water supply and the ‘Big Pong’
breakdown of the sewage treatment works in Adelaide, has contributed to a public perception
that microeconomic reform is associated with reduced reliability.
Public perceptions are not necessarily accurate. There are, however, reasons for
concern about the impact of microeconomic reform n the reliability of supply. Reductions
in employment of maintenance workers have been an important source of cost reductions
arising from icroeconomic reform. Ceteris paribus it would be expected that reduced
maintenance would be associated with reduced reliability. It seems likely that the effects
of reduced maintenance have been offset by technological improvements that have enhanced
the reliability of most types of plant and equipment. However, the same t chnological
improvements have also enhanced the importance of reliable electricity supplies. Even
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momentary interruptions in power can be costly for computer-based systems. Although
advocates of microeconomic reform have frequently criticised the ‘gold-plating’ (exces-
sively high technological standards) said to characterise the pre-reform system, no cost–ben-
efit analysis has been undertaken to determine optimal levels of reliability. For all that we
know, ‘gold-plating’ may be a socially optimal policy.
A further difficulty arises from the policy of vertical disintegration. In the reformed
system, no single entity is responsible for the reliability of the system as a whole, or of
services to any individual consumer. State governments have traditionally been regarded
as being ultimately responsible for infrastructure services, but their capacity to intervene
in the day-to-day workings of a national market is now limited. NEMMCO maintains
some generating capacity, including backup generators that are maintained to ensure that
the power system can be restarted after a widespread blackout, and 'reactive power'
which is produced in order to control the power system voltage. State regulators can
impose performance requirements on distributors, and retailers may be subject to condition
imposed to protect consumers.
On the other hand, some aspects of mi roeconomic reform in infrastructure industries
seem likely to improve incentives to achieve appropriate levels of supply reliability. The
majority of interruptions to supply arise because of breakdowns in the distribution network.
Before reform, the suppliers of distribution services were elements of a self-regulating
monopoly enterprise. After reform, they retain their monopoly status but must satisfy
performance criteria imposed by external regulators. The separation of the roles of regulator
and service supplier should generate a better match between the social goal of reliable
supply and the incentives facing market participants.
No such external regulation applies to electricity generators. Their incentives for
supply reliability are assumed to arise from the high opportunity cost of breakdowns in
periods of peak demand. However, as noted above, the low and variable frequency of
demand peaks implies that the market mechanism is highly sensitive to modest violations
23
of the assumption of a perfectly competitive market. The collective benefits to generators
arising from high prices imply that there is a strong incentive to collude, implicitly or
explicitly, in practices leading to suboptimal reliability of supply.
Privatisation
For most, though not all, advocates of reform, corporatisation and competitive re-
structuring were seen as steps towards an ultimate goal of privatisation. This goal represented
a reversal of the policy trends observed in the first half of the 20th century, when a
number of private electricity suppliers were nationalised. Private businesses were seen as
unwilling to take the necessary risks to develop public infrastructure and as demanding
excessive returns when they did so. This perception was reflected in the key finding of the
Royal Commission set up in 1948 by the conservative Playford government in South
Australia to examine the performance of the privately-owned Adelaide Electric Supply
Company. The Royal Commission observed:
Over the period of the last 24 years [to 1948], the Company has paid in
dividends and interest nearly 2 million pounds more than if the Treasury
rate had been paid. Future capital costs at Treasury rates would result in
reduced capital costs and lower charges
(quoted by Linn 1996, p. 47)
On the basis of this and other findings of inadequate performance, Playford n tionalised
the industry. The point made by the Royal Commission about the relative costs of private
and public capital remains at the core of the privatisation debate today, though this is
often obscured in the presentation of the issues. A numb r of other issues remain unresolved.
The first issue relates to the assessment of the evidence on the relative performance
of publicly-owned and privately-owned enterprises. On balance, the majority of studies
24
find that privately-owned firms have lower costs. However, in some sectors, such as
water supply the opposite is true. Moreover, the differences are relatively small if attention
is focused on corporatised public enterprises operating in competitive markets. Some
analysts, such as Domberger and Piggott (1986) conclude that market structure is more
important than ownership. In contrast, Quiggin (1996) argues that corporatisation eliminates
most operational differences between public and private enterprises. Beesley and Littlechild
(1983) reject both views, arguing that ownership per se makes a substantial difference.
A second set of issues relate to the role of regulation. King and Pitchford (1998)
argue that where an enterprise generates externalities requiring regulation, and complete
contracts cannot be written ex a te, regulation may be less costly under public ownership
than under private ownership. The excess cost of regulating private monopolies will be
reflected in a reduction in the price private buyers are willing to pay for a publicly-owned
asset.
Finally, there are disputes over the cost of capital for publicly-owned enterprises,
and public investments more general. These disputes began in the early 1970s when
Arrow and Lind (1970) argued that, in general, it was not appropriate to impose a risk
premium in calculating the discount rate for public enterprises. Numerous critics of
Arrow and Lind argued that, in the absence of demonstrable market failure, the government
should use the same discount rate as the private sector.
The cost-of-capital debate has been revived in the context of privatisation. Walker
(1994) and Quiggin (1995) argued that, when the prices at which public assets are sold is
compared to the flow of earnings foregone, discounted at the real government bond rate,
most Australian privatisations have reduced the net worth of the public sector.
A theoretical basis for this argument was presented by Grant and Quiggin (1998),
based on the ‘equity premium puzzle’, that is, the fact that the market risk premium is
much larger than would be expected on the basis of a standard life-cycle consumption
model incorporating perfectly efficient capital markets. Grant and Quiggin show that the
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observed equity premium is consistent with the existence of undiversifiable background
risk, as suggested by Mankiw (1986), and that, when such risk is present, the optimal
discount rate for public investments is close to the real bond rate.
Supporters of privatisation, such as Domberger (1995), Hathaway (1997) and Officer
(1999) have reiterated the view that the government should use the same discount rate as
the private sector. They have also argued that, if the public sector did face a lower rate of
discount, the optimal policy would be for public ownership of all enterprises. As Quiggin
(1997) observes, this reductio ad absurdam would be correct if there were no differences
between privately-owned and publicly-owned firms other than those arising from the cost
of capital. Quite small differences in operating efficiency can offset the difference in the
cost of capital associated with the equity premium. Where such differences favour the
private sector, privatisation will pass the present-value test.
Quiggin (1995) discusses characteristics that make an enterprise more or less suitable
for privatisation. Small enterprises with modest capital requirements, operating in compet-
itive markets with little need for regulation are most suitable for privatisations. Large
capital-intensive enterprises operating in highly regulated markets with considerable mo-
nopoly power are least suitable.
In the context of the National Electricity Market, the breakup of integrated monopoly
suppliers has produced enterprises with radically different characteristics. Electricity re-
tailers and wholesalers appear very well suited for privatisation, except to the extent that
distributors retain a retail function. On the other hand, transmission and distribution
activities are natural monopolies requiring continuing regulation. Generation has interme-
diate characteristics, suggesting the possibility of a mixture of public and private operators.
In practice, however, distinctions of this kind have not been drawn in Australian
policy debates. A major source of difficulty is the fact that transmission and distribution
assets account for the majority of the capital value of the industry, while the market value
of publicly-owned retail assets is negligible. Hence, a proposal to privati e retail assets
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alone, or even retail and generation assets, has little appeal to governmens concerned
with the cosmetic effects of asset sales on budget balances and levels of public debt.
Hence, privatisation proposals have normally involved the sale of the entire industry.
On the other hand, politicians opposed to privatisation have generally found it
easier to maintain a stance of unqualified support for the status quo. S e however Quiggin
et al (1988) for a proposal to divest the retail activities of the Australian Capital Territory’s
publicly owned electricity and water supplier ACTEW.
Proposals for privatisation of state-owned electricity enterprises have been put
forward in most Australian jurisdictions, but so far, privatisation has taken place only in
Victoria and South Australia. The Liberal government of Tasmania was defeated in 1998
in an election fought primarily on the issue of electricity privatisation, and the NSW
Liberal Opposition suffered a similar fate in 1999, even though it was well known that
the leading members of the Labor government favored privatisation of the state’s electricity
assets, as proposed by the Opposition.
The Victorian electricity privatisations appear to have been among Australia’s most
successful in terms of their effect on the net worth of the public sector. Unfortunately, it
is difficult to obtain sufficient information on the conditions of the sale and on performance
prior to privatisation to undertake a complete evaluation. Nevertheless, the sale price of
nearly $20 billion implies annual interest savings of $1.2–1.4 billion per year, which may
be higher than the sustainable flow of earnings in public ownership.
Returns from the Victorian privatisations were boosted by a number of factors.
First, Commonwealth tax concessions effectively subsidised the purchasers. Second, the
sale took place at a time when regulatory changes in the United States had encouraged
US utilities to undertake overseas investments. Third, the pro-business and deal-oriented
nature of the Kennett Liberal government, which led investors in transmission and distri-
bution assets to expect favourable regulatory treatment. Particularly since the unexpected
defeat of the Kennett government in 1999, regulators have set rates of return lower than
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those expected by investors. Finally, the decline in returns to generators arising from the
introduction of the National Electricity Market was not fully anticipated.
Even allowing for the impact of tax concessions, it is clear that the purchasers of
Victorian electricity assets paid more than the private value of the assets. Some assets
have subsequently been resold at significantly lower prices. For example, the electricity
transmission business Powernet was sold at a discount of 17 per cent to its original price
(Moran 2000).
The privatisation of the South Australian electricity industry has reduced the net
worth of the public sector. South Australia is an electricity importer, so the bulk of the
sale price (more than $4 billion out of a total of $5 billion) was realised through the sale
of transmission and distribution assets. In the final year of public ownership, earnings
before interest and tax were $368 million, of which the distribution and transmission
assets contributed $300 million. In the absence of regulatory decisions that reduce the
nominal return to these assets, the interest savings on the sale price will fall consistently
short of the earnings foregone through privatisation. This is consistent with most Australian
experience of privatisation.
Concluding comments
The National Electricity Market is still developing. Some problems that have emerged
in the early stages such as the disparity between the substantial price reductions for large
customers and the largely unchanged prices paid by households will fade away as the
market matures. Other issues such as the structure of the industry and the degree of
horizontal and vertical integration will be resolved by a mixture of market processes and
regulatory interventions.
Some problems, however, are likely to become more rather than less acute. The
Australian National Electricity Market commenced operation in a period of oversupply
so that problems of market power and excessive prices have not emerged until recently. It
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remains unclear whether an electricity auction market can produce adequate incentives
for investment while generating appropriate prices for consumers. Similar problems are
emerging in relation to the regulated monopoly component of the industry, the transmission
and distribution sector. Regulators must set prices that do not reward inefficiency or
allow monopoly profits, but nevertheless provide appropriate incentives for new investment.
This is a delicate balance.
In the longer term, the problem of the environmental impact of an industry relying
predominantly on carbon-based fuels remains to be addressed. A market solution would
involve the creation of emissions credits that could be traded along with electricity in
national markets. Although limited steps have been taken in this direction, much remains
to be done.
References
Arrow, K. and Lind, R. (1970), ‘Uncertainty and the evaluation of public investment
decisions’, American Economic Review 60(2), 364–78.
ABARE (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics) (1995), Au tralian Energy
Consumption and Production, Research Report 95.1, Canberra.
Australian Greenhouse Office (2000), National Greenhouse Gas Inventory: Analysis of Trends
and Greenhouse Indicators 1990 to 1998, Canberra.
Beesley, M. and Littlechild, S. (1983), ‘Privatisation: principles, problems and policies’, Lloy s
Bank Review (149), 111–37.
Christensen, L. R. and Greene, W. H. (1976), ‘Economies of scale in U.S. electric power generation’,
Journal of Political Economy 84(4), 655–76.
Davis, G. (2001), ‘State of the State address, January 8, 2001’,
http://video.dot.ca.gov/state/transcript.html.
Domberger, S. (1995), ‘What does privatisation achieve? — A comment on Quiggin’, Australian
Economic Review (2nd quarter), 43–7.
Domberger, S. and Piggott, J. (1986), ‘Privatisation policies and public enterprise: a survey’,
Economic Record 62(173), 145–62.
Grant, S. and Quiggin, J. (1994), ‘Nash equilibrium with markup-pricing oligopolists’, Ec nomics
Letters 45, 245–51.
Grant, S. and Quiggin, J. (1998), ‘The equity premium puzzle and the privatisation paradox’,
29
Paper presented at Industry Economics Conference, Australian National University,
Canberra.
Green, R. J. and Newbery, D. M. (1992), ‘Competition in the British electricity spot market’,
Journal of Political Economy 100(5), 929–53.
Hathaway, N. (1997), ‘Privatisation and the cost of capital’, Agenda 4(1), 1–10.
Hayek, F. (1937), ‘Economics and knowledge’, Economica NS4(1), 33–54.
Hirshleifer, J. (1989), Time, Uncertainty and Information, Basil Blackwell, New York.
Industry Commission (1995a), Does Pacific Power have Market Power? A Report on the
Implications for the National Electricity Market of New South Wales Generation Options,
AGPS, Canberra.
Industry Commission (1995b), The Growth and Revenue Implications of Hilmer and Related
Reforms: a Report by the Industry Commission to the Council of Australian Governments,
AGPS, Canberra.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1995 ), IPCC Second Assessment Report: Climate
Change, IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland.
Joskow, P. (1985), ‘Vertical integration and long-term contracts: the case of coal-burning electric
generating plants’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 1(1), 33-80.
King, S. and Pitchford, R. (1998), ‘Privatisation in Australia: understanding the incentives in
public and private firms’, Australian Economic Review 31(4), 313–328.
Klemperer, P. D. and Meyer, M. A. (1989), ‘Supply function equilibria in oligopoly under
uncertainty’, Econometrica  57(6), 1243–77.
Lange, O. and Taylor, F. (1948), On the Economic Theory of Socialism, University Of Minnesota
Press, Minneapolis.
Lerner, A. (1944), The Economics Of Control: Principles Of Welfare Economics, MacM llan,
New York.
Linn, R. (1996) ETSA — The Story of the Electricity Trust in South Australia, ETSA Corporation,
Adelaide, South Australia.
London Economics (1995), Market power in the Australian electricity market: a report to the
Industry Commission, No. August.
Mankiw, N. G. (1986), ‘The equity premium and the concentration of aggregate shocks’, Journ l
of Financial Economics 17, 211–19.
Mehra, R. and Prescott, E. C. (1985), ‘The equity premium: a puzzle’, Journal of Monetary
Economics 15(2), 145–61.
Newbery, D. (1997), ‘Pool reform and competition in electricity’,  Paper presented to the IEA/LBS
Lectures on Regulation Series VII, 11 November.
Officer, R. R. (1999), ‘Privatisation of public assets’, 1–22 in CEDA (Committee for Economic
30
Development of Australia) (ed.), Privatisation: Efficiency of Fallacy? Two Perspectives,
Sydney.
Quiggin, J . (1995), ‘Does privatisation pay ?’, Australian Economic Review 95(2), 23–42.
Quiggin, J. (1996), Great Expectations: Microeconomic Reform and Australia, llen nd Unwin,
St. Leonards, NSW.
Quiggin, J. (1997), ‘The equity premium and the government cost of capital: a response to
Neville Hathaway’, Agenda  4(4), 475–88.
Quiggin, J.,Saddler, H.,Neutze, M.,Hamilton, C., and Turton, H. (1998), The privatisation of
ACTEW: the fiscal, efficiency and service quality implications of the proposed sale of
ACT electricity and water, Australia Institute Discussion Paper No. No. 20, Canberra.
Rann, A. (1998), Electricity Industry Restructuring — A Chronology, Parliamentary Library,
Canberra.
Walker, R. (1994), ‘Privatisation: a re-assessment’, Journal of Australian Political Economy 34,
27–52.
31
